Abstract-IMS(IP Multimedia Subsystem) network uses SIP (Session Initiation Protocol) as its core control protocol. The defensive ability of the malformed SIP message is particularly important for IMS network security. In this paper, we propose a malformed SIP generation method based on SIP parsing mode and the associated attack testing method. Based on SIP parsing mode of functional entities in IMS, we generate effective malformed SIP messages, which then be used to perform attacking test to IMS functional entities by establishing different session models, so as to evaluate the defensive ability of these entities and provide recommendations for improving the security of the IMS network. We generated a set of malformed SIP messages through this method and apply them to the attacking test of the well-known IMS testbed OpenIMSCore under different session models. The testing finds new vulnerabilities in OpenIMSCore, which shows that our method of malformed SIP messages generation is effective.
servers, cloud computing can provide flexible and efficient services. For the advantage and characteristic of cloud computing, Telecommunication network, including IMS, can be integrated with Cloud computing for its services and management [6] [7] . Therefore the security of IMS network is also important for the services and assets in cloud computing.
SIP is the core session control protocol in IMS and the security of SIP is particularly important to IMS security. However, as the rapid expansion of SIP, more and more vulnerabilities of SIP protocol stacks are discovered, including vulnerability appeared in the protocol stack implementation when dealing with malformed SIP messages. The current security mechanisms in IMS, including IPSec and TLS cannot defend the attack aimed at the availability of the IMS service, such as the vulnerability in protocol stack implementation caused by malformed SIP messages. Therefore, if there are vulnerabilities in implementation of SIP protocol in IMS entities, the malformed SIP messages may trigger the vulnerability and affect the entities and service of IMS. Therefore, the defensive ability of IMS entities to the malformed SIP message is particularly important for security of IMS network and assets in cloud computing.
At present, there isn't a general method of generating malformed SIP message for IMS entities. Existing works on malformed SIP messages are designed for the entire network which there is no distinction among the various entities in the network [8] , [9] . If we use these malformed messages to test the various entities of IMS network directly, there is high possibility that the messages are discarded because they don't match the SIP parsing mode of IMS entities, as a result, they are unable to trigger the vulnerability of the SIP protocol stack in IMS entities. What's more, when we attack IMS network with malformed SIP messages, the attack effect in different session models could be completely different. Therefore, we need a more systematic method for malformed SIP generation and attacking.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a malformed SIP generation and attack method based on SIP parsing mode. Through analysis of SIP parsing mode of various IMS network entities, we raise its potential vulnerabilities with which designs the method to generate malformed SIP messages for different entities. We carried out attacking test to IMS network with malformed SIP messages in different session models and verified the defensive ability of IMS network entities to malformed SIP messages.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Since SIP plays an important role in IMS network, the security mechanism of SIP is very important to SIP itself and IMS network. However, for the convenience purpose of parsing and handling of SIP, SIP messages are transported in a plain text way. And the protocol itself doesn't have any build-in security and authentication mechanism. Because of the lack of security mechanism, the system based on SIP faces various threats including registration hijacking, session hijacking, tearing down sessions, impersonating a server and so on [3] [10] .
To solve problem of lacking of security mechanism in SIP, IETF proposed several third party security mechanisms for SIP system and IMS network [11] . The SIP protocol adopts the request/response mode of HTTP, so the security mechanism of HTTP, such as HTTP Authentication and HTTP Digest, can be used in SIP session. SIP can also uses protect mechanism in the transport layer(e.g. TLS) or the method in network layer(e.g IPSec) to provide confidentiality and integrity protection. S/MIME is also a SIP security mechanism since the content type of SIP can be MIME.
Although various security mechanisms are proposed to provide security protect of SIP messages, vulnerabilities of SIP protocol stacks are discovered now and then. NVD is the U.S. government repository of vulnerability data. This data enables automation of vulnerability management, security measurement and compliance. From 2000 to 2011, there are 254 records about SIP vulnerabilities in NVD [12] . Especially after 2006, there are more than 20 SIP vulnerabilities records every year, as shown in Figure 1 . Therefore, the threat and vulnerability of SIP are still serious problems to the IMS network. Looking closer to the vulnerabilities recorded in the NVD, we found that most vulnerabilities appeared in the SIP protocol stack implementation. Although there are standard mechanisms in SIP and IMS security system, security holes were often introduced inadvertently in the software when different vendors implement their own protocol stacks. Take the vulnerability of CVE-2012-0330 [12] as an example, the vulnerability exists in Cisco TelePresence Video Communication Server with software before X7.0.1 and it's triggered by malformed SIP message, causing device crash. It is a typical protocol implementation error when parsing malformed message. The same situation also exists in IMS network. There are no security protocol specifications in IMS to protect IMS from malformed SIP message. The current security mechanisms, such as IPsec and TLS, can only protect the integrity and confidentiality of IMS, but cannot guarantee the availability of the IMS service. What's more, when IMS is integrated with cloud computing, the availability of the IMS service is also important to the assets in the telecom cloud. Therefore we should focus on the vulnerabilities in SIP implementation and use malformed SIP messages to test the defensive ability of IMS network entities. The research on design and testing technology of malformed SIP messages to IMS has a lot of significance for protecting the service of IMS and its attached assets in the telecom cloud.
When designing malformed SIP, it is notable that exception elements are diverse and complex. You can obtain malformed SIP messages by modifying a normal message at random. But it would result in a large number of malformed SIP messages that are difficult to be classified. Let's assume the average size of a normal SIP message is 1K, and there are 256 choices for every character. So we may obtain 1024 256 messages when we modify a normal SIP message at random. Most of these messages are malformed since SIP has strict format for every fields. However, most of these malformed SIP messages will be discarded by the access device of IMS(e.g. P-CSCF or SBC) because they don't match the SIP parsing mode of IMS entities or the session model of IMS. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a malformed SIP generation method based on SIP parsing mode that is able to produce malformed message for different IMS entities according to certain rules, so as to reduce the blindness of malformed message design and enhance the effectiveness of malformed message attack testing. Figure 2 shows the general process of generatiion and attacking method based on SIP Parsing Mode. By analyzing the SIP parsing mode of IMS entities, we designed the malformed exceptions and malformed values of different message fields for various IMS entities. Then we defined rules according to the parsing mode of SIP in different IMS entities. By applying these rules to a SIP message template, the malformed SIP messages can be generated automatically. If a new field is added in the SIP message or the existing field's parsing mode is changed, we can easily add or change the self-defined rules in the rule library accordingly. Thus, the proposed method is very extensible. For each SIP field that is parsed by some IMS entity, the malformed SIP generator parses the self-defined rules and choose the appropriate malformed exception and value to instantiate the SIP message template to produce the malformed SIP messages for the specific IMS entity. The malformed SIP sender will then send the generated messages under different attack model and collect the response and state of the IMS entities under test.
III. OVERVIEW

IV. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we will briefly describe the IMS network, including its characteristic, functional entities and the integration with cloud computing. Then we will introduce the definition and components of SIP protocol as well as the important role it plays in IMS network. We also discuss the potential impact of malformed SIP messages on IMS entities.
A. Background
IMS adopts layered architecture which consists of the application plane, control plane and user plane. IMS network entities can be classified into six major categories: session management and routing (CSCF), database (HSS,SLF), interconnection elements, services, support entities and billing. The CSCFs include P-CSCF(proxy call session control function), I-CSCF(interrogating call session control function) and S-CSCF(serving call session control function) [13] . These functional entities are core entities for the interaction between the user and the IMS network. They play a crucial role in the network services. User equipments initiate registration and establish call sessions with the IMS network through these CSCFs.
Cloud computing is a rising information technology in recent years. So far, cloud computing has not a unified standard definition. In essence, cloud computing is an Internet-based super computing model, which uses virtualization technology to integrate the large amounts of data and processor resources to make the relevant calculations and data storage services provide in a elastic way [14] . Cloud computing has good scalability, reliability and flexibility. Its architecture consists of three layers including SaaS (Software as a Service), PaaS (Platform as a Service) and IaaS (Infrastructure as a Service).
In order to utilize the above advantage of cloud computing, some researchers suggests to integrate telecommunication network, such as IMS, with cloud computing to form telecom cloud. Cloud computing can supply flexible computing resource renting service and backup and disaster recover service for IDC and provide support for telecommunication products and services [6] . IaaS can also be served as development platform used for building the IMS system [7] . IMS can provide various application services with AS (Application Server) with high QoS assurance. The development of services in AS can be carried out in PaaS and deployed as SaaS. Therefore the security of IMS network will certainly affect the security of services and assets in the telecom cloud.
SIP is the application layer control protocol proposed by IETF for multimedia communications over an IP network [1] . It is also adopted as the signaling control protocol in IMS network by 3GPP [15] . SIP is a layered protocol which includes Syntax and Encoding Layer, Transport Layer, Transaction Layer and Transaction User Layer. A SIP message is composed of three parts: startline, message-header and message-body. SIP is expanded by 3GPP organization to accommodate the characteristics of mobile networks and IMS network and is used for session control information exchanging between the terminal and the CSCFs [16] .
In the IMS network, a SIP message usually needs to be processed by several different functional entities along its path. The SIP fields and the corresponding processes are usually different for these entities. In case there is a vulnerability of SIP processing in one of the entities, the malformed SIP message may cause the entity entering an abnormal state, which will probably affect the quality of service of the IMS network dramatically or damage the attached assets and services in the telecom cloud.
B. Related Work
Recently, some telecom operators have deployed cloud computing platform. AT&T provides application hosting services that provide customized virtual host machines and storages to users in a pay-per-use manner. China mobile has built BigCloud to provide remote storage, large capacity database and search engine services for personal and enterprise users [6] . There are also some researches on the integration of telecommunication network with cloud computing. Xu Lei et. al. [14] described how operators can set up manageable cloud computing services using existing telecommunications services so as to create new business values. Jiannliang Chen et. al. [7] take IaaS as a platform for building IMS network, use PaaS for system administration and use SaaS to enable users to obtain information and services. In this way, they integrated cloud computing and IMS network to form telecom cloud and obtain high-quality multimedia services.
Since the IMS network can be integrated with the cloud computing, the research on malformed SIP messages to IMS is important for both the security of IMS service and the security of the attached cloud asset. At present, some researches have been done on malformed SIP messages and robustness testing of SIP systems.
Xu Luo et. al. [8] and Xiang Yang et. al. [9] present methods for robustness testing for SIP systems based on TTCN-3. The approach in [8] extracts the input syntax, then generates invalid inputs and automates the testing execution to perform an automatic robustness testing. The approach in [9] conducted SIP robustness testing using TTCN-3 on four SIP entities. These two methods mainly aim at the SIP robustness testing and don't consider how the SIP is use in IMS and don't make a distinction between various entities. What's more, they don't consider the different testing effect on different SIP session in IMS and don't present how they designed the input syntax. Thus the architecture proposed by these two methods may not be appropriate and the pertinence and comprehensiveness of the methods is weak when used in the IMS network.
The Protos Test-Suite:c07-sip [17] [18] design a testing tool to simulate the real situation that SIP servers are attacked by a large number of concurrent malformed messages. The approach exacts the normal SIP messages and modifies them to form malformed messages with established rules and probabilities to conduct a random testing. This method is based on exacting normal SIP messages and modifying them. But in some test scene, such as IMS network with IPSec, the SIP messages in IMS are protected and can't be extracted by the testing tool. In this test scene, the testing tools may not be able to carry on the test. And the testing tool doesn't generate malformed SIP messages offline, so it doesn't provide classification of malformed SIP messages, the test effect of different malformed messages is hard to evaluate.
The methods at present all have limitations when applying to malformed SIP testing for the IMS network. To solve these problems, we analyzed the SIP parsing mode of various IMS entities, designed the malformed exceptions and values, and used them to generate malformed SIP messages for different IMS entities. We carried out attacking test to an IMS network with different malformed SIP messages under different session models and shows the effectiveness of the proposed method.
V. CASE STUDY
In this section, we describe in detail the concept of SIP parsing mode at first. Then, we will show how to generate malformed SIP messages based on SIP parsing mode. Finally, we describe the malformed SIP messages attacking mode in the IMS and present the results of our test.
A. SIP Parsing Mode of IMS Entities
Definition 1 (SIP parsing mode): SIP parsing mode refers to the way the SIP entities parse the received SIP message. It includes SIP extracting mode and SIP processing mode.
Definition 2 (SIP extracting mode): The SIP extracting mode defines which fields of the SIP message will be extracted by the SIP entity.
The SIP extracting mode can help us to infer the possible security events caused by the potential security vulnerabilities that can be triggered by the field extracting operation.
Definition 3 (SIP processing mode): The SIP processing mode defines the ways to manipulate the SIP fields after they are extracted by the SIP entity. The manipulations include storage, string segmentation, matching and so on.
By analyzing the correlations between the SIP processing mode and security events, we are able to pinpoint the potential security vulnerabilities that can be triggered by the field processing operations.
Definition 4 (SIP parsing mode of IMS Entities): The SIP parsing mode of IMS refers to the SIP extracting and processing mode of IMS network entities on the received SIP messages.
As the type of values that can be filled in the SIP message fields is different, the SIP parsing mode of IMS entities on various SIP fields are also different. Therefore, there may exist different kinds of vulnerabilities in IMS entities that can be triggered when various SIP fields are processed. According to the values of SIP fields and SIP parsing mode of IMS entities, we proposed a set of possible malformed exception.
A SIP message has a specific format and the values of every field differ in different sessions. We set the session parameter as the changeable part to transform a normal SIP message to the corresponding SIP message template. A SIP message template consists of two parts: the field headers and the changeable session parameters of the field values. By analyzing each field of a SIP template parsed by the IMS entities and design various malformed exceptions and malformed values for this field to replace the value of session parameters, we can generate many malformed SIP messages based on one SIP message template. A template of INVITE message is shown in Figure 3 . The field headers include Call-ID, CSeq, From, To and so on and the session parameters are the parts embraced by square brackets. If we replace the session parameters with normal or abnormal values, we can obtain a normal or malformed SIP message. For P-CSCF, the extracting fields in INVITE message include: Request URI field, Call-ID field, Cseq field, From field, To field, Max-Forwards field, Route field, Contact field and P-Preferred-Identity field.
After P-CSCF extracts the SIP fields, it will process various fields with different operation, which is defined by the SIP processing mode. According to [4] , we define the SIP processing mode of P-CSCF on various fields as follows:
• Max-Forwards: convert it to number, minus one and compare it with zero. If it is not equal to zero, it is converted to a new string; • Via: store the branch value and add its own address to the Via field; • Request URI, Call-ID, CSeq: store the field value;
• From, To, Contact: store the field value;
• Route: delete its own address from the Route field;
• P-Preferred-Identity: store the field value and delete it from the message; • Content-Length: convert it to number and extract the message body according to the value. Similarly, when S-CSCF receives a SIP message, it will carry out extracting operation and processing operation as well. On one hand, due to the different functions of the entities, the extracting field will be different. For example, P-CSCF will store P-Preferred-Identity field and delete it, but S-CSCF will not process this field in the follow-up treatment. On the other hand, the processing approach to the same field may be different in various entities. For example, S-CSCF not only stores From, To and Call-ID field value, but also carries out session query with the field value. For CSeq field, S-CSCF also carries out integer conversion and comparison operations. Therefore, when generating malformed SIP messages, entities should be treated differently according to their SIP extracting and processing mode. For example, there should be malformed messages with abnormal P-Preferred-Identity field for P-CSCF, but malformed messages with integer processing exception for S-CSCF.
From the above analysis, we defined the SIP parsing mode of other IMS network entities. According to the difference of the SIP parsing mode, we designed the related exceptions and malformed values.
B. Design the Malformed Exception And Malformed Value
According to the SIP parsing mode of IMS, we classified the malformed exceptions into several categories. Each kind of exception may result in a specific abnormal state when the IMS entities carry out extracting or processing operation. For fields containing string values, such as From and To, the designed exceptions includes empty, very long string and \0 etc, which are meant to be extracted and stored. For fields containing numeric values, such as Max-Forwards, the designed integer exception include -1, 0, and very large integer, which are meant to be converted from string to integer. We also designed semantic exceptions such as negative number or large integer to the value of the Content-Length field, so that the IMS entities may occur memory overflow when extracting the message body. For the field carrying out host query, such as Request-URI, we designed exception in host address so that address-related vulnerabilities may be triggered when performing DNS resolution. For all message fields, we designed UTF-8 exception aiming to trigger the encoding vulnerability.
According to the characteristics of the malformed exceptions, we designed malformed values for each exception type. The design goal of the malformed value is to cover all of the possible malformed types, and provide enough diversity so as to trigger the vulnerability with high possibility. At the same time, the designed malformed values should be destructive so that when the IMS entities parse the values, their security could be harmed in some way, such as performance degradation, overflow and even collapse. As S-CSCF and I-CSCF are located behind P-CSCF, when we design malformed values, especially the overflow exception, the number of item repetition should increase in a ladder-like way (e.g. a(8192), a(16384) and a(32768)), and not to set as a very long string immediately, so as to avoid the large value of the field to cause exception on P-CSCF directly, instead of triggering vulnerabilities in S-CSCF and I-CSCF.
According to the above analysis, we designed the malformed exceptions and values, as shown in Table I .
C. Generate Malformed SIP Message
Through analysis of processing operation in SIP parsing mode of IMS and the value type of a given SIP field, we obtained the malformed SIP messages for the given field. The value type of the fields, the corresponding operations in the SIP parsing mode and the related malformed exceptions are shown in Table II .
From the analysis above, we can define some selfdefined rules according to the SIP parsing mode, add the rules to the knowledge base and match the rules to generate the malformed SIP messages with the help of expert system. The architecture of malformed SIP generator is shown in Figure 4 . The self-defined rules are added into the knowledge base of expert system as the expert knowledge. The input of the expert system is the target entity and field name of SIP message, the inference engine of expert system will match and infer the rules automatically according to the input and give out the answers. The goal and output of expert system is malformed value of the given field. Then we replace the target field in the SIP template with the output malformed value and replace the other fields with the normal values.
In that way, we can get a malformed SIP message aimed at the target entity. The properties of a given SIP field include field name, field type, field mode and field value. The field name serves as input and field value is the goal of expert system. Field mode indicates the operation to the field corresponding to the entity's SIP parsing mode. Field type and field mode can be got in the inference progress of expert system. Part of the Self-defined rules in the knowledge base are shown below, in which Exception represents malformed exception: The entity and field name are inputs of the expert system and they are also served as initial facts to the inference engine. The inference engine takes the existing facts as the condition of the rules. If all the conditions of a rule can be satisfied, the results of this rule can be inferred to serve as new facts. The inference engine will match the rules according to the existing facts and generate new facts to get the final output step by step. Let's take P-CSCF and FUser field as an example. According to the SIP parsing mode of P-CSCF on the FUser part in From field, the extracting and parsing mode of the field is Store and the field type is String. Thus, the rules for P-CSCF and the FUser field are added into knowledge base(e.g. Rule 1 and Rule 3). Then we can start the inference procedure for this field. The initial facts are "The entity is P-CSCF" and "The field.name is FUser", the inference engine searches for the appropriate rules and matches the Rule 1 and Rule 3 automatically, inferring the new facts which are "The field.type is String" and "The field.mode is Store". The expert system doesn't get the final result of malformed values, so the inference procedure will continue. The inference engine then matches Rule 5 according to two new facts about the field type and field mode to infer the new facts which are "Exception include Overflow" and "Exception include \0". Finally the inference engine will match Rule 7 according to the facts about exception and entity and get the malformed field value a(32768) and end up the inference procedure. We then replace the corresponding value in the SIP template with the final result of expert system to generate new malformed SIP messages for testing field of P-CSCF. The process of generating the malformed SIP messages is shown in Figure 5 .
When a new field is added to the SIP protocol or the SIP parsing mode of IMS changes, we can just add a new rule or modify the existing rules in the knowledge base according to the type of the new field and its parsing mode. In a similar way, if a new exception for some field is discovered or some exception and value are proved to be invalid for IMS entity, we can also add, delete or modify the rules in knowledge base. In this way, we can use the same generation engine and follow the same progress to generate new malformed messages for this newly added field or exception automatically.
D. Malformed SIP Attack under Different Session Models
IMS is a stateful network. The procedures that IMS entities handle SIP messages differs to the registered users and unregistered users. For an instance, when the user equipments send INVITE or Cancel messages, if there is no pre-registration or a initiated call, the IMS entities may not parse the malformed SIP messages and instead discard it directly, thus no chance to trigger the vulnerabilities in the SIP processing. Therefore, when carrying out malformed SIP attack testing, session models should be established in the first place. Then, one can test the defensive ability of malformed SIP messages of the IMS entities under different session models. The attack methods in different session models are shown below:
• Session Model 1 ( Figure 6 ): Unregistered users send malformed messages and collect results. Users in the IMS get registered with the REGISTER message. So if a malicious user sends a malformed REGISTER message with an unregistered user name to the IMS network, the IMS entities will take it as a normal registration attempt. The IMS entities will parse and store the important session parameters such as From, To, Call-ID, CSeq in the first round REGISTER message according to their SIP parsing modes and send 401 response to the user [4] . When the entities receive the second round REGISTER message, they will extract the session parameters and compare them with the values stored. Therefore, in this session model, if we send two malformed REGISTER messages with exceptions in session parameters field(e.g. From or To) to pretend to be a normal registration attempt, the messages may trigger the vulnerabilities in the IMS entities.
P-CSCF
IMS Malformed Message
User(Unregistered) Fig. 6 . Session Model 1
• Session Model 2 ( Figure 7 ): Registered users send malformed messages and collect results. Registered Users in the IMS network get re-registered with the REGISTER message. So if a malicious user sends malformed REGISTER message with a registered user name, the IMS entities will take it as a normal re-registration attempt. The IMS entities will extract the important session parameters and check some of them with the stored session parameters [4] (e.g. the number in CSeq), then carry out the same operation as a normal re-registration. Therefore, if we send two malformed REGISTER messages with exceptions in the session parameters field, especially in CSeq, the messages may trigger the vulnerabilities in the IMS entities. When the IMS entities receive an INVITE message, they will check the P-Preferred-Identity field to decide whether the calling user has registered in the IMS network [4] . If unregistered, the IMS entities would discard the message. Therefore, in this session model, if we send malformed INVITE messages with exceptions not in the P-Preferred-Identity field, the messages probably not trigger the vulnerabilities in the IMS entities. user in HSS using Request URI and P-CSCF will store session parameters field for successful session setup. What's more, the IMS entities will verify the correctness of the value in the CSeq field [4] . Therefore, in this session model, exceptions in CSeq and Request URI may trigger the vulnerabilities in S-CSCF and exceptions in session parameters field, such as From and To, may trigger the vulnerabilities in other IMS entities. 
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E. Results & Analysis
For the important fields, such as From, To , Call-ID and so on, we have generated corresponding malformed messages for different IMS entities using the aforementioned rules and method. We have generated 113 malformed REGISTER messages according to the REGISTER SIP template mentioned in Figure 11 Among all these malformed messages, the exception fields are From, To, Via, Call-ID and CSeq. These fields can indicate a session in SIP and are extracted by different entities in every SIP session. The exception Overflow, \0 Type, Host Type, Integer and Formet String can affect IMS entities and it illustrated that vulnerabilities exist in IMS entities when they parse these fields and there may be no exception handling for these malformed type. The number of different successful exceptions are shown in Figure 12 and we can find that Overflow are the uppermost vulnerability in IMS entities. Among these malformed SIP messages, different exception and malformed value may affect different entities. Since the self-defined rules designed by us are based on the SIP parsing mode of IMS entities, the malformed messages are generated to aim on the specific entity and affect it to enter some abnormal states or crash immediately. The typical malformed exception and value which caused IMS entities entering abnormal states in the test are shown in Table IV and Table V. We take the To field as an example to show the analyzing process of the testing result. According to the SIP parsing mode, P-CSCF and S-CSCF both carry out extracting and processing operation on the To field. The difference is that P-CSCF only stores To field value, but S-CSCF will query session state according to the To field value. Both of them are vulnerable to the overflow exception. Since S-CSCF is located behind P-CSCF, too large overflow will result in P-CSCF collapse. Therefore, the overflow exception targeting S-CSCF should not be too large, so that it can trigger the vulnerabilities in S-CSCF, without affecting P-CSCF. The results show that for different entities, the malformed messages generated according to the SIP parsing mode are able to trigger the vulnerabilities of SIP processing in the IMS entities.
Compared with Proto-c07 [17] , our method provides a general rule-based method for generating malformed SIP messages according to the SIP parsing mode. We can use the rules and the associate program to generate malformed SIP messages for any field automatically. At the same time, since our method is based on the SIP parsing mode of IMS and the malformed exceptions and values are designed through the analysis of vulnerabilities in the field extracting and processing operations, the generated SIP messages is specific to the IMS entities under test. This enhances the pertinence of the malformed messages, simplifies the malformed types and reduces the number of generated malformed messages. Our method is able to carry out malformed SIP attack to IMS networks with different messages targeting related entities under different session models. Compared with Proto-c07, the testing scenarios are more complete and representative. In the test, we successfully triggered the vulnerabilities in some IMS entities and caused them entering abnormal states, such as crash and no response, by sending the malformed SIP messages specific to these entities. Therefore, the testing result indicates that the proposed malformed SIP generation and attack method is effective.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a malformed SIP generation and attack method based on SIP parsing mode. Using this method, one can generate malformed SIP messages for different IMS entities in an automatic way and can perform attack testing with them under different session models. The experiment shows that our method can discover vulnerabilities in SIP processing of the IMS network entities effectively. Tools based on this method can make contributions to enhance the SIP processing security of the IMS entities and the telecom cloud. In the future research, we plan to enrich the rules so that the generation of malformed messages of other protocols that are heavily used by the telecom cloud, such as HTTP and XML, is also supported. We also plan to define a more intelligent generation engine that is able to support fuzzy rules.
